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ABSTRACT
Conflicting observations have been found in the literature regarding the effect of 
operating conditions on ESD (electrostatic discharge) susceptibility. While some studies 
have suggested a strong correlation between the two, others observed little to no 
correlation. In this work, a systematic study has been carried out suggesting the existence 
of a strong correlation between the ESD susceptibility and operating conditions. It is 
found that the root cause of this conflict is random ESD noise injection. A measurement 
approach is proposed to synchronize the noise injection with the system activity such as 
high/low CPU load. In this approach, the current consumption or the EMI 
(electromagnetic interference) of the device under test is monitored and used to 
synchronize the injections.
To improve the poor repeatability of the ESD tests, the proposed approach is 
incorporated into a robotic scanner to create an automated ESD tester. Soft failure 
detection algorithms are added to the tester, giving it the ability to detect (and 
characterize) a soft failure in a similar way as a human -  through sight and hearing. This 
is the first time that image processing algorithms are used for characterizing soft failures. 
Using the tester, a 2-D color-coded susceptibility map is obtained for each soft failure. 
These failure-specific maps can be used to identify/pinpoint the sensitive locations of the 
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An electrostatic discharge (ESD) can disturb the sensitive circuitry of an 
electronic device. Such an event can upset electronic components and lead to a hard 
failure, a soft failure, or a latch up. Hard failures are irreversible damages. Simply, the 
damaged component stops working. Soft failures on the other hand can be recovered 
from. A power-cycle, reboot, or even simple time-lapse can clear the soft failure. Latch 
ups can lead to increased current consumption, excessive heat, faster battery discharge, 
and even permanent damage through overheating.
1.2. RELEVANT STANDARDS AND THEIR SCOPE
ESD susceptibility testing can be done at the component level or the system level. 
The former scenario is called component-level testing and is covered by the JEDEC and 
the ESDA. These standards only focus on hard failures. System-level testing on the other 
hand is established by IEC and focuses on both hard and soft failures. Table 1.1 compares 
important aspects of these standards with each other. An important aspect of system-level 
testing as shown in the table is that it is application-specific, as opposed to the JEDEC, 
and ESDA standards that are standardized. Also, as shown in Figure 1.1, the IEC current 
waveform (system-level testing) has higher energy. In other words, the system design has 
to meet more stringent requirements than component-level design. Another important 
difference observed in Table 1.1 is that the system is tested under both powered and
unpowered conditions in system-level testing, as opposed to only unpowered testing in 
component-level testing. Due to these differences, even if robust components were used 
in a system, there would be no guarantee that the system would pass system-level testing 
criteria (a common misconception). Therefore, it is important to perform system-level 
testing and meet the requirements.
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Figure 1.1. Current levels of Human Body Model (HBM) at 1 kV, Charged Device 
Model (CDM) at 250 V, and System level IEC 61000-4-2 at 8 kV. Adopted from [1].
1.3. OBJECTIVE AND CONTRIBUTION
This dissertation is focused on ESD-induced soft failures, which is part of the 
system-level testing and is covered by the IEC 61000-4-2, “Testing and measurement 
techniques -  Electrostatic discharge immunity test.” This standard only represents a 
scenario where a charged human body discharges to a point on a system through a metal 
object. No information is given on what the system operating conditions should be, or 
whether there is a correlation between the system ESD susceptibility and the operating 
conditions. Searching the literature for an answer, we found conflicting studies. While 
references [2, 3] reported a correlation between the ESD susceptibility and operating
conditions, other studies such as [4] did not observe any correlation as shown in 
Figure 1.2.
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Table 1.1. System-Level vs. Component Level ESD. Adopted from [1].
Component level ESD System-level ESD
Standard JEDEC, ESDA IEC
Environment Factory assembly End used normal operation
Test setup Standardized Application dependent
EUT applications IC System (PC, cell phone, etc.)
EUT operation Unpowered Powered and unpowered
Discharge R-C network 100 pF/ 1500 Q 150 pF/ 330 Q
Typical test voltage 1-2 kV 2-8 kV
Peak current 0.7 A/kV 3.75 A/kV
Rise time 2 to 10 ns 0.6 to 1 ns
Pulse width 150 ns 50 ns






IC protection circuits 
and concept
System design
Failure Hard Hard and soft
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Figure 1.2. No correlation was reported. Adopted from [4].
The goal of this dissertation is to determine the root cause of the confliction in the 
literature and find out whether there is a correlation between the ESD-induced soft 
failures and the operating conditions. Further goals of this dissertation are to develop 
proper measurement techniques and setups to enable the observation and investigation of 
this (potential) correlation.
This dissertation is composed of four papers. Paper I systematically analyzes soft 
failures as a function of various operating conditions. Paper II proposes the required 
measurement setups and techniques to observe the “operating condition-ESD 
susceptibility” correlation. Paper III, for the first time, introduces image and audio 
processing algorithms for soft failure detection and characterization. Paper IV performs 
automated soft failure investigations by equipping a humanoid robotic arm with the 
algorithms developed in Paper III.
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PAPER
I. SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS OF ESD-INDUCED SOFT-FAILURES AS A 
FUNCTION OF OPERATING CONDITIONS
Omid Hoseini Izadi 
Department of Electrical Engineering 
Missouri University of Science and Technology, Rolla, MO, 65409 
E-mail: ohp63@mst.edu
ABSTRACT
Electrostatic discharges (ESD) to parts of a system can lead to system-level soft- 
failures. These failures can depend on the activity of the system at the moment of 
discharge. This paper investigates ESD susceptibility as a function of different operating 
conditions such as software loading, clock frequency, and VDD voltage. Due to the large 
number of possible conditions, a commercial automated ESD scanner is modified and 
used to obtain ESD susceptibility maps for each operating condition. The core processor 
of a single-board computer is selected as the device under test. It is observed that the 
processor becomes more sensitive to ESD events as its software loading increases. The 
effect of VDD voltage and clock frequency on the sensitivity of the processor is also 
discussed. Moreover, the effect of increasing the power distribution network impedance 
and noise is investigated, partially leading to counterintuitive results.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Electrostatic discharges (ESD) can couple into an integrated circuit (IC) via its 
pins and cause different types of system-level failures. ESD energy can also directly 
couple to the bond wires and cause a failure. Typical examples are loss of data, data 
corruption, program termination, system hang, system reset, latch-up, etc. These type of 
failures are known as soft-failures as the system recovers by power-cycling. Soft-failures 
can be grouped into two categories with respect to software loading conditions: those that 
are not affected by the core processor loading and those that have an increased likelihood 
to occur if the processor is highly active [1]. For instance, coupling to the reset circuitry 
or system clock will most likely lead to a system reset or hang up, independent of the 
loading condition. However, memory access disturbance will only lead to visible effects 
if the memory was active at the moment of the disturbance.
In [2, 3], via many measurements on single-board computers, it has been shown 
that occurrence of a specific soft-failure might depend on the program, running on the 
system. The authors have shown the core processing IC of a smartphone became more 
sensitive to ESD events when a computationally intensive application was running 
compared to the case where the device was in standby mode [4]. These studies focused 
on the relationship between the system loadings and susceptibility, but no work was done 
on systematic analysis of the susceptibility concerning operating conditions of the 
system.
The susceptibility of a device under test (DUT) as a function of different 
operating conditions such as software loading, clock frequency, power distribution
network (PDN) noise and impedance, and VDD voltage is investigated for 5 different 
platforms. However, only one DUT is thoroughly analyzed in this paper. To better 
understand the effect of each condition on the susceptibility, the conditions are analyzed 
by obtaining ESD susceptibility maps for each condition. A susceptibility map shows the 
TLP voltage required to cause a soft-failure at various locations on the DUT. Such maps 
can be obtained by coupling noise to the DUT (through a magnetic field probe) while 
monitoring the system behavior. Magnetic probe is preferred to reduce chances of 
permanent damages to the DUT. If a soft-failure occurs, the TLP voltage and location are 
recorded for plotting. Figure 1 shows a typical susceptibility map. The small red dots 
indicate the probe position, and the color bar shows the voltage required to cause failure 
at each location. Due to the large number of positions required to obtain each map and 
the large number of possible conditions, manually obtaining the complete set of 









Figure 1. A typical susceptibility map.
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For instance, obtaining one susceptibility map for a 15^15 mm IC can take up to 
14 hours. In [5], an automated scanner is developed and used for obtaining ESD 
susceptibility maps. In [6], a commercial version of the robot scanner is used for 
analyzing root causes of system-level immunity sensitivities. This product is modified 
accordingly and then used to obtain the ESD susceptibility maps as a function of different 
operating conditions as discussed in Section 2 and 3, respectively.
Figure 2. Block diagram of the automated scanner built around an API robot scanner, 
MATLAB, TLP, Arduino UNO and a couple of interfaces.
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2. MODIFICATION OF THE ROBOT SCANNER
A fully automated ESD scanner requires many features such as automatization, 
failure detection, power-cycling and rebooting the DUT, verifying a successful reboot, 
detecting the DUT operating phases by monitoring its current consumption, software- 
activity-based injection of ESD noise, performing synchronous or asynchronous 
injections, changing TLP source voltage, changing injection location, and recording the 
injection voltage and robot arm coordinate. These requirements can be satisfied by the 
proposed block diagram and flowchart.
2.1. BLOCK DIAGRAM
Figure 2 shows the block diagram of an automated ESD scanner built around an 
API robot scanner [7], a transmission line pulse generator (TLP) with a rise time of about 
300 ps, and an oscilloscope. The injecting probe is a Hz probe consisting of a small loop 
with a diameter of 2 mm. The probe can produce both Hx and Hy fields at the same time. 
Hence, there is no need to scan the IC using probes of Hx and Hy orientation. Full-wave 
simulations showed the maximum generated magnetic field at 1 mm distance under the 
Hz probe when the probe loop is driven by 1 A of current, is about 114 A/m. This field 
strength can induce about 10 mA of current in a 1^0.5 mm loop placed at 1 mm below 
the probe and 1 mm to the side as shown in Figure 3. These two loops are placed 
orthogonally to mimic the orientation of the probe relative to possible coupling structures 
inside an IC (DUT). The exact dimensions and the induced current will depend on the 
details of the IC structures and the package. The current going to the probe loop and the
resulting field strength is set by the TLP source voltage. For instance, 1000 V charge 
voltage will lead to 20 A of current inside the probe loop as the loop forms a short. The 
selected DUT for our investigation is the CPU of a BeagleBone Black (BBB). This 
single-board computer has a Linux-based operating system with root access allowing us 
to control the CPU parameters from within the code.
10
Figure 3. The orientation of the Hz probe loop relative to possible coupling structures
inside the IC at two different views.
As shown in Figure 2, the BBB current consumption is monitored using a current 
sensor and an oscilloscope. The oscilloscope is configured to generate a trigger pulse 
when it detects a certain current level. The number of generated pulses per second 
depends on the running application on the BBB. About 3 to 8 pulses can be generated 
every second. The generated pulses are too narrow for the Arduino to detect (~10 gs); 
thus, Interface 1 is placed between the oscilloscope and the Arduino to increase the pulse 
width. Upon detection of the pulse, the Arduino sends an injection command to the TLP. 
The TLP source voltage also is controlled by the Arduino by using a digital to analog 
converter (Interface 2). As the main controller of the automated scanner, the Arduino
11
continuously reports the scanner status to MATLAB. This information helps MATLAB 
to control the robot arm accordingly. The functionality of the system is explained in more 










Record voltage value and go 
to next location Yes
Yes
TLP: Next voltage 
stepPower cycle DUT
YesReset TLP voltage to
minimum value
Startfind
Robot: Go to start position
TLP: Set source voltage
Figure 4. Automated ESD scanner functionality flowchart.
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2.2. SYSTEM FLOWCHART
Figure 4 shows the flowchart of the automated ESD scanner. Turning on the 
system causes the robot arm to move to the start position and power up the BBB. The 
voltage of the TLP source is set to a preset value (defined by the user). Once a successful 
boot is confirmed, the system starts injecting ESD noise on the BBB via the Hz probe.
The Arduino increases the TLP voltage to the next step if no failure detected and more 
than 100 injections performed. The voltage steps are logarithmically spaced to minimize 
the total number of voltage steps for covering the whole voltage range of the TLP source 
(0 V to 5 kV). In this paper, 15 voltage steps were used. Once the final voltage step is 
reached, the robot arm moves to the next location, the source voltage goes to the default 
value, and injection starts again. If the BBB fails during any of the mentioned stages, the 
source voltage, which caused the failure, and the probe coordinates are recorded. The 
system then power-cycles the BBB. On the other hand, if no failure is detected and the 
maximum TLP voltage (5 kV) is reached, the Arduino power-cycles the BBB and 
requests MATLAB to move the probe to the next location. These processes continue until 
the entire IC (i.e., all 120 locations) is scanned.
For the BBB, the most common failures are CPU hang, and reduction of the clock 
frequency to 300 MHz or 500 MHz. The CPU hang is detected by comparing the blinking 
rate of the onboard LED against a timer (in Arduino). When the LED stops blinking (i.e., 
a failure occurred), the timer overflows, and a failure flag is set. The other common 
failure, (i.e., reduction in the clock frequency) can be detected by monitoring the current 
consumption waveform of the BBB. Once the clock frequency reduces, the current
consumption decreases resulting in no more trigger generation and; hence, raising a 
failure flag.
3. EFFECT OF CPU CONDITIONS ON ESD SUSCEPTIBILITY
3.1. CPU LOADING
Three different CPU loadings are <5%, ~50%, and ~100%. The lowest load 
(<5%) is created by putting the system in standby mode; i.e., no additional code is 
running. The 50% load is generated by using a freely available code named “CPU-load- 
generator” This code can generate an arbitrary CPU load from 1% to 99% using a pulse 
width modulation (PWM) technique. The highest load (100%) is created using a code 
developed by the authors. The code fully loads the CPU by running intensive 
mathematical calculations (multiplication, division, and addition) in a loop. The effect of 
CPU loads on the susceptibility of the IC is then investigated using the automated ESD 
scanner.
Figure 5 shows the ESD susceptibility map of the BBB CPU for various software 
loadings at 1 GHz clock frequency. The ESD susceptibility maps depict the sensitive 
regions of the IC to ESD noise and the corresponding TLP source voltage at each 
location. For this study, knowing the TLP source voltage is sufficient as the maps are 
compared together. The blue regions in the maps indicate the locations where the IC did 
not fail at all while the dark red regions show the most sensitive locations of the IC. The 
largeness of the orange/red regions (i.e., area), and/or the redness of the regions (i.e.,
13
color) indicate the increased sensitivity. In some cases, only one of the two factors can 
indicate the increased sensitivity as will be shown later.
14
Figure 5. ESD susceptibility map of the BeagleBone Black CPU for various software
loadings at 1 GHz.
3.2. CLOCK FREQUENCY AND VDD VOLTAGE
Besides the CPU loading, CPU clock frequency may also affect the sensitivity of 
the CPU. The underlying thought is that the upper limit of the clock frequency is often 
given by signal integrity inside the IC. As the signal integrity of the IC diminishes with 
increasing the clock frequency, it is plausible to expect increased sensitivity for the IC. 
Investigation of the effect of the clock frequency requires full control over the CPU 
frequency. In other words, the operating system must be unable to control the clock 
frequency once it is set by the user. Such level of control, over the system, calls for 
administrative control (or root access) which may not be granted by default. Once this 
access is acquired, the automated scanner can be used to obtain ESD sensitivity maps as a 
function of CPU clock frequency. Figure 6 shows the ESD susceptibility map of the BBB 
CPU obtained for various clock frequencies at 50% loading. Contrary to one’s
expectation, the CPU became more robust as the clock frequency increased. This 
observation can be explained as follows:
On the BBB board, there is a power management IC (PMIC) which provides and 
manages different VDD voltages for different parts of the board. Once a higher CPU 
clock speed is requested, the CPU communicates with the PMIC through an I2C bus 
requesting a higher voltage on CPU VDD_Core pin. According to the CPU datasheet [8], 
the VDD_Core voltage can vary between 1.056 V and 1.144 V. A higher VDD_Core 
voltage makes the IC more robust because a larger ESD event is required to cause a 
failure. As a measure for quantifying and comparing the IC robustness, the number of 
locations in Figure 6 with a TLP voltage of less than 700 V and less than 3 kV is counted 
and shown in Table 1. As indicated by this figure and Table 1, the IC becomes less 
susceptible, as the VDD_Core increases.
15
Figure 6. ESD susceptibility map of the BeagleBone Black CPU for various clock 
frequencies (/VDD_Core voltages) at 50% load.
Another measure for quantifying the IC robustness could be the minimum TLP
voltage needed to upset the IC at each clock frequency. As shown in Figure 7, the
16
minimum TLP voltage increases by 275%; i.e., from ~400 V to ~1500 V as the 
VDD_Core voltage increases by ~8%; i.e., from 1.056 V to 1.144 V. One may argue that 
the IC robustness should increase accordingly (~8%); however, it increased by 275%. 
Due to lack of deep understanding of this IC and its failure mechanisms, this argument 
could not be addressed fully. A plausible explanation, however, could be given by 
considering the available voltage margins for the ESD event at each VDD_Core (/clock 
frequency) voltage.
Figure 7. Minimum TLP voltage at each clock frequency (/VDD_Core voltage).
As shown in Figure 8, the VDD_Core voltage can swing between 1.056 V to
1.144 V. Assuming the lowest VDD_Core voltage at which the IC can function properly 
is 1 V, there is a 56 mV margin for the ESD event to cause a failure when the VDD_Core 
voltage is at 1.056 V, whereas the margin is 144 mV when the VDD_Core voltage is at
1.144 V. Therefore, the available margin for the ESD noise increases by 256% which is
close to the observed increase of 275%. This point of view can explain the observed 
increase of the TLP voltage in Figure 7.
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Table 1. Number of locations (out of 120) with a TLP voltage less than 700 V and 3 kV 
at various VDD_Core voltages (/clock frequencies).
1.056 V 1.1 V 1.144 V
<700 V 3 1 0





“  ~ 144 mV margin 
-56  mV margin
Figure 8. Available voltage margin for the ESD noise.
3.3. PDN NOISE AND IMPEDANCE
Increasing the PDN impedance, and consequently, the PDN noise of the BBB 
may cause the CPU to become more susceptible to ESD events. This investigation 
requires removal of all decoupling capacitors (decaps) connected to the VDD_Core 
voltage rail. Since the capacitor in the LC filter of the PMIC DC-DC converter can also 
act as a decoupling capacitor, it must be removed too. However, removal of this capacitor 
prevents the DC-DC converter from operating. A workaround is to add a low pass filter 
consisting of a ferrite bead paralleled with a low value (2 Q) resistor between the 
capacitor and the rest of the circuit. Therefore, the capacitor cannot act as a decap and the 
DC-DC converter is not disturbed anymore.
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Figure 9 compares the PDN impedance for the case where all decaps are removed 
(green trace) to the case where no decaps are removed (blue trace). The bump at ~2 MHz 
in the green trace is caused by the 2 Q resistor. At higher frequencies, the 2 Q resistor is 
dominated by the impedance of the PDN inductance (~3 nH). For the case where no 
decaps are removed, 12 dB/dec slope of the blue trace at higher frequencies suggests that 
the impedance is not purely inductive. Figure 9 clearly shows that the PDN impedance 
increases when all the decaps are removed.
Removing the decaps also affects the PDN noise. Figure 10 and Figure 11 show 
the PDN noise as a function of removed decaps at 50% and 100% loading, respectively. 
The peak to peak noise voltage increased from ~6 mV to ~80 mV for both load 
conditions. In Figure 11, the voltage spikes are present regardless of the presence of the 
decaps; removing the decaps only increased the magnitude of the spikes. Figure 12 and 
Figure 13 illustrate the effect of removing decaps in the frequency domain for 50% and 
100% loading, respectively. As observed, the broadband noise level increased by ~10 dB 
whereas the magnitude of the harmonics increased by ~10 to 35 dB. Moreover, 
comparing Figure 12 (a) with Figure 13 (a), and Figure 12 (b) with Figure 13 (b) suggest 
no additional harmonic is generated when the CPU load increases from 50% to 100%. 
Only the amplitude of the spikes increases.
By intuition, one may expect the CPU sensitivity to increase when the decaps are 
removed. This hypothesis is tested by obtaining the susceptibility map for various CPU 
loadings, and clock frequencies before and after the decaps are removed. Figure 14 shows 











frequency is set at 1 GHz. For both loadings, the CPU becomes more sensitive when the 
decaps are removed. However, this is not the case at all clock frequencies.
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a b
Figure 10. PDN noise as a function of removed decaps at 50% CPU load. a) Noise before 
and after removing decaps. b) Close up view of the noise before removing decaps.
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b
Figure 11. PDN noise as a function of removed decaps at 100% CPU load. a) Noise 
before and after removing decaps. b) Close up view of the noise before removing decaps.
a
a b
Figure 12. PDN noise in frequency domain for the 50% CPU load. a) No decap removed.
b) All decaps removed.
Figure 15 illustrates the effect of removing the decaps at various clock 
frequencies. As shown, the IC becomes more sensitive after removing the decaps when 
the clock frequency is 500 MHz and 1 GHz. Due to the visual similarity of the plots, the 
sensitivity is quantified by counting the number of locations with a TLP voltage of less 
than 700 V and less than 3 kV. Table 2 and Table 3 show the number of locations that
require <3 kV to fail increased by 32% and 107% at 500 MHz and 1000 MHz, 
respectively when the decaps are removed. Despite Figure 15 (a) and (c) which suggest 
the IC becomes more sensitive after removing decaps, Figure 15 (b) suggests the IC 
becomes more robust when the decaps are removed. The core reason for this behavior is 
not clear to the authors; however, this discrepancy can be diminished by taking into 
account the minimum TLP voltage, before and after removing the decaps as follows.
In Figure 15 (b), the minimum TLP voltage for the with-decaps case is 650 V; 
whereas, it is 340 V for the decaps removed case. This reduction in the TLP voltage 
indicates the IC becomes more sensitive after removing the decaps. However, the 
increased sensitivity is only reflected in the form of reduced minimum TLP voltage and 
not enlarged (non-blue) area as was the case in Figure 15 (a) and (b). Although the root 
cause of these observations is not clear to the authors, this result suggests that the 
behavior of complicated ICs can be deeply investigated using high-resolution 
susceptibility maps obtained by the ESD scanner.
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Figure 13. PDN noise in frequency domain for the 100% CPU load. a) No decap




Figure 14. Effect removing decaps on CPU susceptibility. a) 50% CPU load. b) 100%
CPU load.
Table 2. Number of locations (out of 120) with a TLP voltage less than 700 V and or less 
than 3 kV at the clock frequency of 500 MHz.
With decaps Decaps removed
<700 V 3 4
<3 kV 25 33
Table 3. Number of locations (out of 120) with a TLP voltage less than 700 V and or less 
than 3 kV at the clock frequency of 1000 MHz.
With decaps Decaps removed
<700 V 0 1





Figure 15. Effect of removing decaps on CPU susceptibility for various clock 
frequencies. a) 500 MHz. b) 800 MHz. c) 1000 MHz.
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4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The effect of several operating conditions on the susceptibility of the BeagleBone 
Black CPU was systematically explored. Due to the large number of required tests for 
this investigation, an automated scanner was developed. Our investigations showed the 
IC became more sensitive as its load increased. However, contrary to our expectations, 
increasing the clock frequency caused the IC to become more robust. The reason for this 
observation was attributed to an increase of the VDD core voltage of the CPU. 
Furthermore, the effect of removing decaps on the sensitivity of the CPU was 
investigated. Although the PDN noise and PDN impedance increased when the decaps 
were removed, the CPU sensitivity did not always increase.
If the goal is to make a system sensitive to ESD without any modifications to the 
hardware, one should select a high load for the core processor and a low VDD voltage. 
Removing decaps will further increase the sensitivity. Motivated by the results obtained 
from this work, more DUTs will be tested to acquire a broader picture of the behavior of 
the core processors as a function of different operating conditions.
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ABSTRACT
Two complementary approaches are presented to help to understand how CPU 
loading affects the sensitivity of an electronic device to ESD (electrostatic discharge) 
stress. Both approaches rely on synchronized noise injection while the software is 
running at the desired load. One of the approaches monitors the device’s current 
consumption while the other monitors the device's electromagnetic field to synchronize 
noise injections. These approaches revealed that as the CPU loading increases, the device 
becomes more active and hence more susceptible to ESD stress. Moreover, it was 
observed that, in each loading condition, the device randomly became susceptible. These 
complementary approaches enable the capturing of high/low active intervals as well as 
the injection of noise voltage to the desired activity, thus, allowing for the analysis of the 
effect of CPU loading on ESD susceptibility.
1. INTRODUCTION
Soft failure investigations are necessary for evaluating the ESD (electrostatic 
discharge) susceptibility of an electronic device. Soft failure is a temporary upset,
disturbing the normal operation of the devices. Soft failures are resolved either 
automatically after a short time (a few seconds) or by power-cycling the device [1, 2]. 
Latch-ups and permanent damages (hard failures) could also happen as a result of ESD 
events [3]; however, they are out of the scope of this paper.
For soft failure investigation, the operating condition of the device under test 
(DUT) should be considered, as the DUT’s susceptibility can change when the operating 
condition changes [4]. Reference [5] has shown that the DUT became more sensitive to 
ESD when the system loading increased. It also reported that increasing or decreasing the 
CPU frequency can affect sensitivity. In [6], the authors observed that, while a file 
compression program was running, other soft failure types occurred other than those 
related to the display. These studies suggest that higher system loading leads to higher 
sensitivity.
On the contrary, other studies did not observe a similar trend. Reference [7] 
reported no correlation between DUT sensitivity and system loading.
In the mentioned works, the ESD noise voltage was injected randomly; i.e., the 
injections were not associated with any particular activity of the DUT. As will be 
discussed in the following sections, random injection is not a suitable approach for 
evaluating the effect of system loading on device susceptibility. A better approach is to 
correlate ESD injections with the DUT activity; in other words, the injections should be 
synchronized to a particular activity, to understand the effect of system loading on the 
device susceptibility.
In this paper, two complementary approaches are presented for synchronizing the 
noise injection to the device activity. The first approach performs injections synchronous
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to the current consumption waveform, whereas, the second approach uses 
electromagnetic interference (EMI). Finally, using a smartphone as our DUT, the 
approaches are put to the test and compared.
2. CURRENT CONSUMPTION-BASED SYNCHRONIZATION METHOD
2.1. MEASUREMENT SETUP
Figure 1 shows the block diagram and the measurement setup. The current sensor 
is a resistor placed in series with the entire PCB of the device and is used to monitor the 
instantaneous current consumption of the device. The voltage drop across this resistor is 
monitored by an oscilloscope. The oscilloscope is set to generate a trigger signal to the 
TLP (transmission line pulse) generator whenever the current waveform exceeds a user- 
defined level, which will be henceforth referred to as the trigger level. Because the trigger 
level depends on the CPU loading and CPU frequency of the DUT, it should be set at the 
peak of the current waveform in order to trigger on high activity intervals, as shown by 
the horizontal dashed lines in Figure 2. Similarly, the trigger level is set at the valley 
points for targeting low activity intervals. With these settings, the oscilloscope is 
triggered whenever the current consumption crosses the trigger level (dashed line). The 
generated trigger passes through the delay-control block, gets delayed, and then is fed to 
the TLP. The delay block compensates for the delay added by the other blocks.
An 8-mm magnetic field probe is used to inject noise into the DUT. When driven 
by 1 A of current, this probe can couple about 10 mA of current into a 1*0.5 mm loop
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Figure 1. Current consumption-based synchronization measurement setup. a) Injection 
probe and DUT. b) Block diagram of entire setup. The delay control circuitry has ~5 ps 
delay, which is negligible compared to the 3.4 ms delay of the TLP generator.
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2.2. SYNCHRONIZATION REQUIREMENTS
For a successful synchronization, the following requirements should be satisfied.
• Steady clock frequency: If the DUT clock frequency can be controlled 
through software, the user should fix the clock frequency. This can reduce 
the variations of the current consumption waveform caused by CPU 
frequency hops. We set the CPU frequency of our DUT at 1 GHz.
• Known delay: The delay between the moment that the oscilloscope is 
triggered and when the actual pulse appears at the TLP output should be 
known with sub-millisecond uncertainty. Most of this delay comes from 
the TLP relay. A mercury relay can reduce the uncertainty to less than
1 ms. The delay caused by the TLP is 3.4 ms ± 1 ms. The delay caused by 
the other blocks is in the range of a few micro-seconds and thus is 
neglected.
• An additional delay should often be added to the total delay such that the 
injection occurs at the next active interval. For instance, in Figure 2c, the 
valley point repeats every ~6 ms, thus, an additional delay of 6-3.4 =
2.6 ms should be added so that the injection happens at the next active 
interval. Although the current consumption waveform is not periodic in 
general, especially at low CPU loadings and low clock frequencies, the 
waveform starts to show a semi-periodic behavior as the CPU loading and 
the clock frequency increase, as observed in Figure 2a, 2b, and 2c.
To generate different CPU loadings, it is recommended to employ a software 
designed for this purpose. A simple infinite loop with arithmetic calculation can intensely
load the CPU; however, other parts of the system (RAM, graphic IC, etc.) may not be 
involved as much as the CPU. Moreover, in case of the loop, the CPU loading intensity 
cannot be changed -  The load would always be close to 100%. In this study, a low load 
condition (below 10%) was created by leaving the DUT in standby without running any 
additional software except for the already running system-related tasks. For creating 
medium load (~50%), a video recording app was used, which could load the graphic IC, 
RAM, and CPU to some extent. Since this app had not been designed for generating a 
well-defined load, the activity of the CPU does not have a specific pattern (see Figure 
2b). This lack of pattern adds uncertainty to the trigger timing. For high load (above 
90%), an app called StressCPU ([8]) was used. This app could create a steady load for the 
CPU and RAM, as shown in Figure 2c.
2.3. PERFORMING SYNCHRONIZED INJECTION AND ANALYSIS
A smartphone is used as our device under test (DUT). Its CPU frequency can hop 
between 300, 500, 800, 1000, and 1200 MHz, which can be controlled by software. Due 
to the lack of proper heat transfer between the CPU and the environment, we limited the 
frequency to 1000 MHz. This limitation is imposed because the injection probe directly 
lands on top of the CPU, which reduces the heat transfer rate. For frequencies below 500 
MHz, the current consumption waveform changes irregularly and smoothly, therefore, it 
was difficult to achieve synchronization, hence the 1000 MHz frequency. To prevent the 
overheat protection circuitry from kicking in and reducing the CPU frequency by 
hardware (forcefully), an external fan cools down the CPU.
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Figure 2. Current consumption of the device under test under different CPU loading. a) 
Low load (<10%). b) Medium load (~50%). c) High load (>90%). The CPU frequency 
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Figure 3. TLP voltage causing a soft failure vs. CPU load. a) Synchronized to low 
activity. b) Synchronized to high activity. c) Random injection.
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The TLP source voltage is increased from 0 to 5 kV until a soft failure was 
observed. The voltage that caused this soft failure is recorded, and the DUT is power 
cycled to return the DUT to its condition before the soft failure occurrence. Repeating 
these steps for low load, medium load, and high load conditions gives us the TLP voltage 
at which the DUT soft-failed vs. CPU load, as shown in Figure 3. Figure 3a, 3b, and 3c 
are obtained by synchronizing the injections to the low activity period of the CPU
(corresponding to Figure 2a), synchronizing to high activity period (corresponding to 
Figure 2c), and injecting randomly (asynchronously), respectively. The red asterisk 
illustrates the average value (of the five repetitions). The following observation can be 
made from Figure 3:
For synchronized injection (Figure 3a and 3b), as the CPU load increases the CPU 
becomes more sensitive, i.e., lower TLP voltages cause a soft failure. Ideally, the CPU 
sensitivity should not be affected, as the CPU was stressed during a particular activity 
period (in low or high corresponding to Figure 3a and 3b). However, this ideal case is not 
achievable because: (1) The CPU loading momentarily fluctuates due to system-related 
apps, housekeeping, or other system activities that are not under the user control; (2) 
during high load condition (see Figure 2c), the valley point of the current consumption 
waveform does not revert to the low value of low load condition (see Figure 2a); in other 
words, the CPU loading baseline value increases as the load increases.
Figure 3b is obtained by synchronizing the injections to high activity periods. As 
expected, the CPU becomes more susceptible when it is highly active. One may also 
expect that the CPU sensitivity should remain steady and high, regardless of the loading 
condition, since the injections are synchronized to high activity periods. This 
contradiction can be explained using the irregular behavior of the system mentioned 
above.
Moreover, it is observed that the average value (red asterisk) in each loading 
condition in Figure 3a is higher than the corresponding loading condition in the 
asynchronous scenario (Figure 3c). This observation suggests the CPU is more robust 
when it is stressed during its low activity intervals.
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Finally, Figure 3 c shows the results for asynchronous injection. Since the 
injections are performed randomly for this plot, it is expected to have a poor repeatability 
or in other words a large distribution, especially at lower loads. As the load increases, the 
idle intervals reduce and become less frequent, drastically reducing the chance of hitting 
a valley point. This trend can be observed in the current consumption waveforms shown 
in Figure 2.
Although the current-based synchronization approach can improve repeatability 
and reduce the uncertainty of the results, its major downside is its requirement for 
monitoring the current consumption of the target IC. For a device with one CPU IC, this 
requirement can be met; however, if more than one CPU IC exists on the device, this 
approach may fail because the total current consumption of the entire device is not a good 
indicator of the target IC activity. An alternative approach is to employ the EMI-based 
synchronization method.
3. EMI-BASED SYNCHRONIZATION METHOD
3.1. MEASUREMENT SETUP
The electromagnetic (EM) field of an IC usually has a broad frequency range. It 
can consist of both broad and narrow band spectral components. Some of these 
components may vary as the activity level of the IC changes. These components can be 
filtered out and used to trigger the TLP.
Figure 4 shows the measurement block diagram. The detection loop picks up the 
field generated by the IC of interest. The acquired signal is then amplified and fed to a
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super-heterodyne bandpass filter, which includes a fixed bandpass filter with 1.575 GHz 
center frequency and 5 MHz bandwidth, two mixers, and one synthesized source. The 
target frequency is mixed up to fall in the filter bandwidth and then mixed down to the 
baseband (0-90 MHz). This process allows sweeping through many frequencies without 
changing the setup. The outputted signal triggers the oscilloscope, and then the TLP after 
being adjusted by the delay-control block.
The selected frequency to pass through the filter and trigger the TLP should be 
unique for each loading condition. A frequency that is used for, namely, low load 
condition should not appear in the spectrum of high load or medium load. Moreover, in 
each loading condition, the magnitude of the selected frequency should significantly 
fluctuate with activity -  at least 10 dB is suggested. The biggest challenge of this method 
is finding a frequency that satisfies these requirements. As shown in Figure 5, there are 
many frequencies to be examined. The selected frequencies in this study are 1.138 GHz, 
1.600 GHz, and 1.200 GHz for low load, medium load, and high load conditions, 
respectively.
Figure 6 compares the current consumption of the device (same smartphone used 
in the other approach) with the signal picked-up by the loop after the super-heterodyne 
filter in each loading condition. As clearly observed in Figure 6b and 6c, the current 
consumption waveform resembles that of the selected frequency, validating the frequency 
selection for these loads. In low load conditions, the DUT is in standby; thus, the signal 
picked up by the loop has a relatively constant amplitude, as there is not much change in 
the DUT’s activity in standby; however, as encircled in Figure 6a, a pattern with small
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magnitude fluctuation can be observed in the filtered signal. The TLP is triggered based 
on this pattern.
As for the medium load shown in Figure 6b, as discussed before, a media 
recording app was employed to generate this load; thus, the CPU activity has an irregular 
pattern, adding uncertainty to the trigger timing. This lack of pattern can be observed 
both in the current waveform and the behavior of the selected frequency component.
Figure 4. Measurement block diagram for EMI-based synchronization method.
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Figure 6. Current consumption waveform compared to the picked-up signal by the 
detection loop after the super-heterodyne filter. a) Low load. b) Medium load. c) High
load.
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As observed in Figure 6c, the filtered signal not only has a semi-periodic feature, 
but it also has large amplitude variation. Therefore, it is expected that the failure voltages 
be relatively less spread out, and the IC be more sensitive in high load. This is discussed 
in the following section.
3.2. PERFORMING SYNCHRONIZED INJECTION AND ANALYSIS
Figure 7 shows the TLP voltage at which the DUT soft-failed vs. CPU load when 
injections are synchronized to the high activity periods. The decreasing mean value for an 
increasing CPU load, suggests that the susceptibility of the device increases when the 
CPU loading increases, i.e., a lower TLP voltage is needed to cause a failure. This 
behavior is consistent between both synchronization methods. Comparing Figure 7 with 
Figure 3c (asynchronous injection), one can observe that a much better uncertainly is 
achieved at low load (<10%). Comparing Figure 7 with its counterpart, Figure 3b, one 
can observe that (1) the data has a large distribution especially at medium load, and (2) 
the failure voltages are usually higher.
Figure 7. TLP voltage causing a soft failure vs. CPU load.
These observations suggest that the EMI-based method should be used as a 
complementary approach for the current consumption approach, or where current 
monitoring is not possible.
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4. DISCUSSION
4.1. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEVEL OF CPU ACTIVITY AND ESD 
SUSCEPTIBILITY
The proposed test methods enable us to analyze the level of CPU activity with 
respect to ESD susceptibility. Some possible physical explanation behind the 
proportional relationship between the level of CPU activity and ESD susceptibility are:
• When the system is highly active, the system draws more power from the 
power distribution network (PDN), leading to increased PDN noise. As 
pointed out in [5], higher PDN noise can lead to higher ESD sensitivity. 
Higher CPU frequencies exacerbate the situation, as expressed by 
Equation (1):
V( f )  = I ( f ) . Z( f ) ,  (1)
where V is the voltage drop across the impedance of the power distribution network (Z), 
and I is the current drawn by the CPU.
• During high CPU activity intervals, more subsystems are turned on, 
compared to those of the low CPU activity intervals. If one or more 
subsystems that are only ON during high CPU activity intervals are more 
sensitive to ESD than others and get disturbed by ESD, the resulting soft
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failure can propagate throughout the system and be observed by the user. 
However, if the subsystem is OFF its failure may remain hidden.
4.2. MULTI-CORE CPU
The CPU of the smartphone under test shown in Figure 1 is a Quad-core CPU, 
which consists of four ARM Cortex A7 CPUs as well as embedded peripherals such as 
USB, Bluetooth and Wi-Fi, Cellular Modem, GPU and Display modules. It is assumed 
that most of the current is consumed by the processors, not the peripherals; therefore, the 
active low and high intervals in the current waveform are caused by the processor 
activity.
Due to the multi-core architecture of such CPUs, in general, it is not clear how, 
namely, a 50% load is distributed between the cores. However, for the CPU tested here, a 
100% load completely loads all 4 cores of the CPU. This was verified using a system 
monitoring app. For a 50% load, since the camera app is being used to generate this load, 
the load distribution is not uniform between the cores. Which is to say that the loading of 
the cores fluctuates. These fluctuations can be limited by preventing the CPU frequency 
to hop (which was done here) and/or use an app to generate a 50% load. The latter could 
not be achieved because of the lack of the needed skills for Android programming. In a 
similar study, however, a code was written in Python to generate the desired load. The 
DUT was BeagleBone Black with a Linux-based operating system called Debian.
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4.3. LEVEL OF SENSITIVITY FOR CPU AND RAM
In a different study, where a BeagleBone Black is used as the DUT, the EMI- 
based synchronization method was performed on the RAM IC. It is observed that the 
RAM is not as susceptible as the CPU. This observation may be different for different 
DUTs.
4.4. ABSOLUTE TLP VOLTAGE LEVEL VS. TREND
The average TLP voltage obtained from the current-based approach is slightly 
lower than the EMI-based approach under the same loading condition. This difference is 
rooted in different test setups. The authors have observed that a 0.2-mm change in the 
injection probe height can change failure TLP voltage. Therefore, absolute TLP voltage 
levels can vary (and should not be compared), while the trend is comparable.
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Motivated by the observed contradiction between different studies regarding the 
effect of CPU loading on ESD susceptibility, we presented two approaches to 
synchronize noise injection with CPU activity and take into account the effect of CPU 
loading. Using the current consumption-based synchronization method, we observed that 
the IC became more sensitive as its load increased. Also, we noticed that regardless of the 
loading condition, the IC susceptibility increased during high activity intervals. While the 
former shows how the IC behaves as a function of loading condition, the latter shows 
how the IC behaves in millisecond windows during each loading condition. Due to these
millisecond active intervals, the asynchronized (random) injection approach could not 
show how sensitive the IC became under ESD stress. The main drawback of the current- 
based approach was the need to access and monitor the current consumed by the target 
IC, which could be impractical in certain devices, such as multi-layered PCBs, or if only 
one of the many CPU ICs is to be tested. Alternatively, the EMI-based synchronization 
approach was presented, which monitored the near field of the target IC, instead of its 
current consumption. Using the EMI-based method, we observed that the target IC 
became more sensitive as its load increased, a trend consistent with that of the current- 
based method. The most prominent advantage of the EMI-based method was at low loads 
(<10%) because there was less variability in the results (compare Figure 7 with Figure 
3b). Therefore, the two methods should not be used interchangeably, but 
complementarily. If the load cannot generate a pattern in the current consumption 
waveform, the EMI-based method should be used instead.
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ABSTRACT
Audio- and image-based soft failure detection methods are developed, which can 
detect both severe failures (such as system hang) and subtle ones (such as glitch or a 
momentary disturbance on display). Incorporating the developed detection methods with 
a robotic ESD (electrostatic discharge) tester, we developed a fully automated soft failure 
investigation tool. Using this fully automated tool, we obtained failure-specific 
susceptibility maps for a camera (our target device). These susceptibility maps not only 
illustrated the sensitive locations of the device, they also showed what type of soft failure 
is correlated with which locations.
1. INTRODUCTION
When an electrostatic discharge (ESD) occurs, the victim device may experience 
a latch-up event, permanent hardware damage (hard failure), or a temporary upset (soft 
failure). Soft failures are temporary and can be solved by power-cycling the device. For 
soft failure immunity testing, one can manually perform a few tests to quickly and 
approximately locate the sensitive locations of the target device; however, for a
systematic investigation, manual testing is not the correct approach. For a systematic 
investigation, it is strongly advised to employ automatization, as manual testing has poor 
repeatability and is time-consuming. Additionally, the likelihood of soft failure 
occurrence can depend on the operating conditions, as investigated in [1], which means 
even more tests might be required. Under these conditions, automatization is the best 
approach.
Automatization can improve repeatability, reduce human mistakes, and in general, 
can produce reliable results; however, it calls for (1) an automated tester for moving the 
injection probe, injecting ESD noise, controlling noise source voltage, etc., and (2) soft 
failure detection and decision making. The focus of this paper is the second requirement 
-  soft failure detection and decision making -  as the first requirement is rather well 
established in the literature. For instance, [2] used a planar scanner to move an injection 
probe on the target device and obtain susceptibility maps for the CPU (central processing 
unit) of the device under test (DUT). Reference [1] used a planar scanner to 
systematically investigate the relationship between soft failures and operating conditions 
by studying the susceptibility maps of the DUT. Both these studies monitored the DUT’s 
DC current consumption in order to detect a soft failure; whenever the current 
consumption exceeded a defined value, a failure flag was raised.
Soft failures can be detected by other methods besides DC current consumption. 
[3-5] investigated several other methods and elaborated on their effectiveness in detecting 
a failure. These methods are listed in Table 1. Among these methods, Down-mixing,
Short Term Fourier Transform (STFT), Kernel calls, and Wavelet Transformation require 
adaptive post-processing; i.e., an operator must adaptively tweak the methods’
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parameters in order to find the irregularity caused by the soft failure(s) in the recorded 
data. Thermal imaging works best for failures that lead to a temperature change (usually a 
temperature rise), which is commonly associated with latch-ups. DC current consumption 
method is simple and effective, however, cannot detect failures that do not cause an 
abnormal change in the current consumption, such as multi-colored stripes on the display 
or a glitch on the display. These are considered failures to the human eye and should not 
be missed. For the Spectral method to detect a failure, the spectral variations caused by 
the failure should be abnormally larger than what it is in normal operation. According to
[4], this method is effective only 31% of the time. Table 1 compares these methods in 
terms of their requirements.
Many of the presented methods lack the ability to detect soft failure independent 
of an operator; they also have lengthy post-processing times [1, 2]. On the other hand, 
simple methods such as DC current consumption and Spectral method are not reliable for 
soft failure detection as they miss failures that do not cause abnormal current 
consumption or abnormal spectral content.
This paper is an extension to our previous paper ([6]); it presents a new, different 
approach that allows for the detection of soft failures in a similar manner that humans do 
-  through hearing and sight. Thus, it is effective for the class of devices with a display or 
a speaker. A few examples of this class are phones, professional and cinematic cameras, 
amateur cameras, sound systems, music players, smart speakers, etc. Any failure that can 
be detected by the user can also be detected by this approach. The biggest challenge is the 
detection of both severe failures such as a system hang or restart, as well as the subtle 
ones such as a momentary display malfunction, defocus, etc.
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Table 1. Soft failure detection methods.
Method Post-processing? Specific requirement?
Short Term Fourier 
Transform (STFT)
Yes Parameter tweak by a human
DC current consumption No No
Thermal imaging No - Infra-red camera 
- line-of-sight between the DUT 
components and the camera
Wavelet Transformation Yes Parameter tweak by a human
Down-mixing 
(to audio band)
Yes Parameter tweak by a human
Spectral method No No
Kernel calls Yes - Parameter tweak by a human
- Dedicated serial port on DUT
In the following sections, we will elaborate on our soft failure detection approach. 
Using a camera and a music player as our target DUT, we develop image-based and 
audio-based detection and characterization methods; then we combine these methods 
with a 6-axis robot to achieve automatization. Finally, the combined system is used to 
demonstrate automated soft failure testing for a different DUT.
2. AUTOMATED ESD TESTING
2.1. SYSTEM BLOCK DIAGRAM
Figure 1 shows the system block diagram of the automated ESD tester. An 
industrial Mitsubishi 6-axis robot is used to move the injection probe on the DUT. The 6-
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axis robot can approach the DUT from any direction and at any angle allowing us to test 
complex 3-D objects [6].
Figure 1. Block diagram of the automated ESD tester when a camera is used as the DUT.
For the case of a music player as the DUT, the webcam is replaced with a mic, and the
monitor is removed.
The DUT (camera) is set to look at the monitor while the monitor is playing a 
video. A webcam, which is connected to MATLAB, is focused on the DUT display. The 
webcam image resolution is set to 400*300 pixels -  higher resolution is not necessary. 
With this image size, about five images can be processed per second. The procedure is 
simple: once the captured image is processed, another image is taken by the webcam, 
transferred to MATLAB to be processed. A higher rate was not needed because the DUT 
reaction to a failure was relatively slow (in the range of couple of seconds).
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Figure 2 shows the system flowchart of the automated ESD tester. The flowchart 
is self-explanatory and is already explained in detail in [1] and [6]; however, the 
necessary blocks are explained here. The algorithms used to decide if the DUT failed 
(“DUT failed?” block in Figure 2) are the core part of this paper and will be discussed in 
detail in the following sections.
2.2. IMAGE-BASED SOFT FAILURE DETECTION
Figure 3 shows the soft failure types observed during more than 50 susceptibility 
tests performed on the DUT (camera). For these tests, an 8 mm magnetic field probe and 
a transmission line pulse generator with ~7 ns pulse width was used to inject a noise 
voltage into the DUT. (See [1] for more detail about the probe structure). All flex cables, 
processors, integrated circuits (IC), etc. were subject to noise injection.
Figure 3a shows the defocus failure. It was observed that the injected noise 
disturbed the control circuitry of the lens, resulting in a defocused image. This failure has 
an occurrence rate of ~15% (out of 50 preliminary tests) and is considered a severe 
failure. It can be solved by either re-focusing or power cycling the camera.
Figure 3b illustrates the vertical strips failure. It has an occurrence rate of more 
than 55% and can only be solved by power cycling. Figure 3c illustrates the vertical gray 
regions failure. This failure requires power cycling to be solved and has a small 
occurrence rate of 5%. Figure 3e is the frozen-image failure. With less than 5% 
occurrence rate, this failure is considered severe too. It needs a power cycle to be solved, 
as it causes a system hang. Figure 3f shows the horizontal colored regions failure. This 
failure cannot be considered as a severe one, as the colored regions appear and disappear
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momentarily, without negative impacts on the normal operation of the DUT. With 5% 
occurrence rate, it might not be of great concern for a consumer camera but could be of 
great importance for a professional cinematic camera. Therefore, it is important to detect 
this failure too. The last failure type is a direct restart and is shown in Figure 3d. It has an 
occurrence rate of more than 15%. In summary, the vertical strips failure, vertical gray 
regions failure, restart failure, and frozen-image failure are considered severe, as they all 
lead to system hang and/or require a power cycle to be solved. The horizontal colored 
regions failure, however, is considered a subtle failure as it shortly appears and then 
disappears.
2.2.1. Feature Extraction of Failures. Figure 3a shows the defocus failure.
Using focus evaluation algorithms, one can evaluate the focus quality of the image. For 
this evaluation, it is important that both the camera (DUT) and the webcam are focused. 
Focus quality can be assessed using algorithms such as Absolute Central Moment 
(ACM), Image Curvature, Brenner's, Thresholded gradient, Helmli's mean method, 
Histogram entropy, Gaussian derivative, Gray level variance, Energy of gradient, and 
many more [7]. In this study, the absolute central moment is used as it can distinguish a 
defocused image from a low contrast one [8]. Equation (1) can be used to calculate the 
focus measure (FM) using absolute central moment. Figure 4 illustrates how much a low 
contrast and a defocused image can look alike.
f =  If=_o1 |i -MlP (0 ,  (1)
where p is the image histogram, p is the image mean value, and f is the calculated focus
measure.
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Figure 2. Flowchart of automated ESD tester. The corresponding block diagram is shown
in Figure 1.
By comparing the focus measure value of one image calculated by the absolute 
central moment algorithm with preceding images, one can keep track of changes in the 
focus measure values and detect a defocus failure. The image content does not affect the
focus measure value; thus, failures such as vertical strips, frozen-image, horizontal 
colored regions, and vertical gray regions do not change the focus measure value, 
drastically; whereas, a restart significantly affects this value. Therefore, the focus 
measure is used for both detecting a restart and defocus failure. A large change in the 
focus measure value (more than 75%) is considered as a result of a restart failure, while 




Figure 3. Observed soft failures for the camera under test. a) Defocus. b) Vertical strips. 
c) Vertical gray regions. d) Restart. e) Frozen image. f) Horizontal colored regions. After 
each failure occurrence, the camera was power cycled to revert it to a known state for the
next test.
The most obvious features of the vertical strips (Figure 3b) failure is the presence 
of vertical lines in the image. The Canny operator [9, 10] can be used to accentuate the 
edges in the image. This operator uses two thresholds to keep track of the edges, which
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makes it a robust algorithm for edge detection purposes. To quantify the detected edges, a 
Hough transformation [11, 12] is used after the Canny operator to convert all the edges 
into line segments. This transformation assigns a value to each line segment, quantifying 
the line length and population. By comparing the total segment length and count of the 
current image with previous images, one can keep track of the changes in subsequent 
images and determine whether a failure occurred or not. Figure 5 illustrates the images 
resulted after edge detection step and Hough transformation. The total number of lines 
detected by this approach (Figure 5c) is 228, which is significantly larger than the total 
lines detected in the image before the failure happened (24 count). In this study, a 
threshold of 100 lines is used. If the stripes appeared horizontally (or in other directions), 
the Canny operator and the Hough transformation still can be applied without further 
changes.
a b c
Figure 4. Comparison between low contrast and defocused image. The similarity can be 
confusing for an algorithm. a) low contrast image. b) defocused image. c) high contrast
image.
The effectiveness of the Canny operator can be improved by applying a line filter 
such as a Sobel (or Prewitt) operator before applying the Canny operator. The Sobel (or
Prewitt) operator convolves the image with a 3*3 matrix in the vertical and horizontal 
direction to roughly calculate the gradient of the image intensity in a computationally 
inexpensive way [13, 14]. The Sobel operator is used in this study, since the lines were 
vertical. This operator should not be used for tilted lines.
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a b c
Figure 5. Steps to detect vertical lines in an image. a) Original image. b) Image after edge 
detection filter. c) Image after Hough transformation. After Hough transformation, the 
segments’ length and count are compared with those of the previous images.
The most prominent feature of the restart failure (Figure 3d) is the sudden change 
of the screen color from mostly white to almost complete black. This sudden change is 
used for detection of the restart failure (in parallel with the focus measure approach).
One can simply add up the pixels color data and compare the sum value with that of the 
baseline image and/or the preceding images. Because of the plain white background in 
the baseline image, the sum of the pixel color data does not change more than a few 
percent, even with the movement of the black ball. If the entire display was completely 
white, a restart failure could turn the display black, creating nearly 100% color change; 
however, because of the presence of the black ball in the image, the restarts change will 
be less than 100%. In this study, a change more than 95% relative to the baseline image is 
considered to be due to the restart failure. This approach (which is named Area
Difference (AD) by the authors) is not computationally expensive and is easy to 
implement.
The Frozen image failure (Figure 3e) can also be detected by the Area Difference 
detector. When this failure occurs, the image on the DUT display will not change; 
therefore, the Area Difference detector would calculate the same value for two back-to- 
back images. In this study, a difference less than 5% between two consecutive images 
indicates a frozen image failure occurred.
Figure 3f shows the colored regions failure. For the camera used in this study, the 
region appears horizontally and in purple, but it can be of any color and shape. To detect 
colored regions failure, the data of all the pixels in each row is added together, which 
results in one value for each row. By comparing these values with other rows in the same 
image, one can determine the occurrence of the colored regions failure, as shown in 
Figure 6. Using Figure 6b, we set the threshold at 0.5e4; a value more than 0.5e4 
indicates the colored regions failure occurred.
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a b
Figure 6. Detection of the colored regions failure. a) Snapshot of the failure. b) Identified
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Figure 7. Image-based detection and characterization algorithm flowchart.
This same procedure is performed in vertical direction (for each column), 
evaluating the presence of a vertical color change in the image. In this way, the vertical 
gray regions (Figure 3c) can also be detected. As for the computational cost, this 
approach is not expensive as the main mathematical operation is a simple summation. 
Figure 7 shows the complete flowchart of the image-based soft failure detection 
algorithm.
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Figure 8. Snapshot of the test video clip, shown on the monitor to the DUT (camera)
during the ESD tests.
2.2.1. Test Video. For easier failure detection, a test video has been created to be 
displayed to the DUT (camera). This test video consists of a white background and a 
moving black ball. Figure 8 illustrates a snapshot of this test video. Its notable features 
are plain, white background, black ball, and movement. The white background helps to 
detect a failure that disturbs color data in the image (such as vertical strips, vertical gray 
regions, horizontal colored regions, and restart failures shown in Figure 3), the black ball 
helps to detect defocus failure, and its movement helps to detect the frozen image failure.
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2.3. AUDIO-BASED SOFT FAILURE DETECTION
In this section, audio-based soft failure detection algorithm is presented. This 
algorithm can detect soft failures that cause a change in the audio signal played by the 
DUT (music player). Similar to the previous section, first we identify the soft failures 
through a preliminary study, then the distinctive features of the soft failures are 
determined, and finally suitable algorithms to extract these features are developed.
Figure 9. Spectral contents of the test audio in normal operation (no failure). This serves 
as the baseline audio. The frequency contents below 700 Hz and above 4 kHz are ignored 
to remove any artifacts around DC, and limit the bandwidth to 4 kHz, respectively.
2.3.1. Test Audio. The test audio track is composed of two single tones at 1 and 
3 kHz. This selection allows the detection algorithm to look for certain properties: 
absolute frequency (two single tones at 1 and 3 kHz), relative frequency distance (2 kHz), 
and relative magnitude with respect to the noise floor. Figure 9 shows the measured 
spectral content of the test audio track in normal operation (without any ESD stress). The
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second tone was selected to be the 3rd harmonic of the first tone to avoid the appearance 




Figure 10. Different variations in spectral contents of the test audio. a) Increased noise 
floor. b) Absence of expected tones (1 and 3 kHz) plus increased noise floor. c) Multiple 
tones. d) Difference between the magnitudes of expected tones.
2.3.2. Feature Extraction of Failures. Figure 10 shows how the spectral content 
of the test audio can change due to a soft failure in this DUT. A different DUT may react
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differently under ESD stress. However, it may generate either a complete silence (i.e., no 
tones), or a combination of humming sound (i.e., increased noise floor), buzzing sound 
(i.e., addition of other tones), or reduced magnitude of one or both tones. The reduced 
magnitude failure may not be easily detected by a human and may not be critical for 
consumer products, but it is important for professional sound systems.
The most prominent feature of Figure 10a is the increased noise floor (by more 
than 30 dB) relative to the baseline sound (compare to Figure 9). This failure produces a 
humming sound as if the tones were recorded in a noisy environment. By comparing the 
average noise floor of the recorded sample with that of the baseline audio, one can 
determine if this failure has occurred. In this study, an increase more than 10 dB is 
considered as a failure. The only time-consuming part of this process is the FFT 
calculation, which considering the sampling rate of the audio file (8 kSa/sec) and the 
short record length (1 sec), it does not take more than a few milliseconds on a laptop. 
After FFT calculation, the frequency contents below 700 Hz and above 4 kHz are ignored 
to remove any artifacts around DC, and limit the bandwidth to 4 kHz, respectively. This 
choice leaves the frequency range of 700 Hz to 4 kHz intact, where the human hearing is 
most sensitive [15, 16].
In Figure 10b, there are two distinct features: increased noise floor, and lack of 
the 1 and 3 kHz tones. This failure can be identified by comparing the magnitude of the 
tones against the average noise floor, or by comparing the average noise floor with the 
average noise floor of the baseline audio. The latter approach was used to detect this 
failure, since the code was already developed; in other words, this failure type is not 
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Figure 11. Audio-based detection and characterization algorithm flowchart.
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The most obvious feature of Figure 10c is the presence of other tones. In general, 
these tones might be close to the expected tones (1 and 3 kHz), which makes the 
detection of this failure more difficult. The algorithm calculates the distance between any 
two random tones; if this distance is more than 1.9 kHz and less than 2.1 kHz, the two 
tones are kept for further processing, and the rest are discarded. If more than two tones 
satisfy the distance criterion, a soft failure has occurred.
The hardest failure to detect is the one shown in Figure 10d because the only 
difference between this one and the baseline audio is reduced magnitudes of the tones, 
one tone more than the other. This failure may not be easy to detect for the human ear, as 
the user might think the volume is low, or the sound was recorded at a low volume. To 
detect this failure, we used two thresholds. Threshold 1, which is set to 20 dB, enforces 
that the tones must be at least 20 dB stronger than the average noise floor. Threshold 2, 
which is set to 5 dB, imposes that the tones must have a magnitude difference of less than 
5 dB. The tones are supposed to have the same magnitude. If any of these criteria are met, 
a failure flag is raised. Figure 11 illustrates the developed audio-based detection 
algorithm.
3. FAILURE-SPECIFIC SUSCEPTIBILITY MAP
Using the developed image-based soft failure detection algorithm in conjunction 
with the automated ESD tester shown in Figure 1, we performed automated soft failure 
testing on a (different) camera. For this test, an 8 mm magnetic field probe was used to 
inject noise voltage to the camera circuitry. The probe was moved by the robot while
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injecting a noise voltage into the DUT. Once a soft failure is detected, the robot position 
and the TLP voltage that caused this failure are recorded by MATLAB. With this 
information, a color-coded 2D susceptibility map can be generated for each soft failure. 
These maps not only show the sensitive locations of the device, but they also show which 
location(s) are associated with what failure type(s). Figure 12 shows the susceptibility 
maps obtained from the backside of the camera under test. The camera is replaced with a 
drawing to preserve confidentiality. The warm colors in the map show the more sensitive 
regions where a lower noise voltage (see color bar values) was needed to cause a failure. 
The colder colors show more robust areas.
For this camera, only two types of soft failures occurred: vertical strips failure, 
and restart failure. The restart failure occurred when the locations shown in Figure 12b 
were disturbed, while the vertical strips failure occurred when the center of the main IC 
and the middle region of the flex cable were stressed (Figure 12a). This flex cable 
connects the main IC to the display IC located on the backside of the display (not shown 
here). One can conclude the main IC is more sensitive than the display IC because 
disturbing the flex cable resulted in the same failure type as it did when the main IC was 
stressed (vertical strips failure). In other words, this observation suggests the same 
circuitry was disturbed in both scenarios.
On the left and top side of the DUT, there exists other circuitry for changing 
focus, controlling the lens, and other settings. Disturbing these circuitries or the flex cable 
connected to them leads to the restart failure. Figure 12b shows the sensitive regions




Figure 12. Susceptibility maps separated by failure type. a) Vertical strips failure. b) 
Direct restart failure. A drawing is used instead of a photo to preserve confidentiality.
4. DISCUSSION
If the camera under test is changed to a different one, new soft failures might be 
observed. It is likely that the algorithm cannot characterize the new failures; however, the 
algorithm can still determine the occurrence of the failures, as explained below.
In general, a soft failure can distort the image by adding extra lines to the image, 
changing the color of the pixels, warping the image, etc. As a result of this distortion, the
lowest block in Figure 7, which looks for circles in the image using a Circular Hough 
Transform-based algorithm [17, 18], does not detect exactly one circle in the image. If 
more or less than one circle is found, provided that the algorithm has not characterized 
the type of the failure yet, a failure flag is raised, and the image is saved for manual 
processing. As such, a new soft failure can be detected without a priori knowledge of the 
failure’s feature(s). In order to characterize a new soft failure automatically, a new 
characterization algorithm must be developed. In the service of this aim, the authors have 
attempted to elaborate on both the development process and logic that went into the 
presented algorithms so that the reader can develop their own as needed when called for 
by the situation.
While thresholds are employed for decision making in the algorithms presented, 
in order to ensure their accuracy for making correct decisions they should be adjusted to 
every DUT. One image (or audio track) that includes the failure of interest is sufficient to 
adjust the threshold(s) associated with that failure. While this is not time-consuming, 
creating the failure of interest might be difficult and time-consuming as soft failures 
could be difficult to reproduce.
Finally, the presented algorithms can be considered a platform for automatized 
soft failure testing, as there is room for improvement. For instance, the algorithms can be 
enhanced by incorporating supervised or unsupervised machine learning algorithms. 
Instead of having a human inspect the new soft failures, extract their features, and set 
thresholds, an algorithm can “learn” to perform these tasks. One of the biggest potential 
downsides of this approach could be the time needed to train the supervised algorithm, 
which could be more than the time required to perform the investigations normally,
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especially considering that thousands of soft failure types might be needed to train the 
algorithm. Unsupervised learning algorithms, on the other hand, do not have a training 
phase. These algorithms try to classify the new soft failures based on the similarities and 
differences between the features of the new failures and those in the dataset. The use of 
machine learning algorithms is only one of many possibilities to improve the presented 
platform.
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5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Automatized soft failure testing can improve the repeatability of the tests and 
allows for systematic, automated investigations. Automatization requires (1) an 
automated tester, and (2) soft failure detection and characterization algorithms. The 
challenge is to detect and characterize both severe and subtle soft failures. In this paper, 
we developed audio- and image-based algorithms to detect both severe and subtle failures 
and determine their types. This approach differs from previous approaches (shown in 
Table 1) in that it detects soft failures in a similar manner the user does -  through sight 
and hearing. These algorithms were then incorporated with a 6-axis industrial Mitsubishi 
robotic arm to perform automated ESD immunity testing on the target device (camera). 
Failure-specific susceptibility maps were obtained for this device; only two types of soft 
failure were observed for this DUT -  vertical strips failure and restart failure. It was 
found that the main IC was more sensitive than the display IC. Moreover, thanks to the 
failure-specific susceptibility maps, we found which sensitive location corresponds to 
what soft failure type.
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Having a failure-specific susceptibility map can help to address an ESD immunity 
issue easier and more efficiently. For instance, a dataset for soft failures and their 
corresponding regions can be generated. In the case of a reoccurring soft failure, the 
sensitive parts/circuitry of the product that is responsible for that particular failure can be 
efficiently identified using the dataset.
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ABSTRACT
A robotic ESD scanning system is presented for scanning complex 3D objects. It 
provides pseudo-2D plots that illustrate the sensitive locations of the device under test on 
a relative scale. Using this system, we could determine the susceptible regions of the 
device. It was observed that disturbing different sensitive regions lead to different soft- 
failure types. Determining the sensitive locations of a complex-shaped DUT helps to 
identify the disturbed circuitry and verify the effect of countermeasures in a repeatable 
way.
1. INTRODUCTION
The energy coupled to sensitive circuitry of an electronic device as a result of 
electro-static discharge (ESD) can cause hard-failure, soft-failure (temporary disturbance) 
[1, 2], or latch-up [3, 4]. Hard-failures are associated with permanent damage, while soft- 
failures can be cured by simply power cycling the system. Latch-ups, on the other hand, 
can lead to a hard-failure, a soft-failure, or an increased current consumption, which can 
drain the battery quickly.
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The root cause of soft-failure can be identified by susceptibility scanning [5]. 
During a susceptibility scan, noise voltages or currents are induced via electric or 
magnetic field probes to the device under test (DUT). These probes are moved over the 
DUT (printed circuit board (PCB), integrated circuit (IC), etc.) while the behavior of the 
object is monitored. The level of injected noise is varied, starting at a low value and 
increasing until a soft-failure is observed, or the user-defined maximum level is reached. 
This is repeated at each test point (location) to obtain a susceptibility map of the DUT. In 
many cases, transmission line pulsers (TLP) serve as the noise source to inject noise in 
the form of nano-second pulses. The induced noise at a given probe location is 
proportional to the TLP charge voltage; thus, the relative sensitivity is often expressed in 
TLP charge voltage [5].
While hand-held probing often guides the engineer during debugging, it is not 
reliable for soft-failure characterization because the probe position is not well-defined. A 
robot can help to increase the chance of obtaining repeatable results and avoid human 
mistakes.
In [6], the authors incorporated a robot to assist them in obtaining a 2D ESD map 
for various operating conditions of a device under test. In [7], a robot was used to 
determine the ESD current propagation throughout a PCB. The authors of [8] employed a 
robot to identify resonances on a PCB. In [9], a robot was used to scan a flat plane to 
localize the radiating sources located on a PCB. These robots can only scan a planar DUT 
with small height variations (a few millimeters). However, geometrically complex DUTs 
have multiple facets that need to be scanned. The robots mentioned above cannot satisfy
this need.
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To address this need, we have used a Mitsubishi industrial 6-axis robot to develop 
an ESD scanning system. 6-axis robots are commonly used for near-field scanning ([10­
12]), due to their ability to reach the object from any direction and at any angle. In the 
following sections, the ESD scanning system block diagram and the corresponding 
flowchart are presented. This system is then used for investigating the sensitivity of a 
camera (DUT). As a result, a sensitivity map is obtained for each facet of the DUT. The 
sensitive regions of the device are identified using these maps.
2. SCANNING SYSTEM TEST SETUP
2.1. BLOCK DIAGRAM AND SYSTEM FLOWCHART
Figure 1 shows the block diagram of the ESD scanning system. The device under 
test is a camera focused on the monitor. The monitor plays a pre-defined moving image 
to the camera during the measurements. A webcam connected to MATLAB continuously 
monitors the DUT’s screen. Any distortion in the image is an indication of a soft-failure; 
therefore, it is essential that the camera and the webcam both be focused. This approach 
was selected because the operator can see the video being played both on the monitor and 
the DUT screen. The operator can validate the system functionality and the image quality 
by comparing the captured image (by the webcam) with the image shown on the monitor.
The Arduino in this diagram acts as the interface between MATLAB, the TLP, 
and the DUT. Upon MATLAB’s command, the Arduino power cycles the DUT, restarts, 
or changes the zoom settings of the camera (to avoid blurry image). The Arduino can also 
change the TLP source voltage via the interface block using a pulse width modulation
(PWM) technique. The interface block acts as a low-pass filter by converting the PWM 
waveform to an analog voltage and hence changing the TLP source voltage. The internal 
circuitry of the interface block and the Arduino code logic are out of the scope of this 
paper.
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Figure 1. Block diagram of the proposed ESD scanning system.
A 6-axis robot allows us to reach the DUT from many angles and to perform a 3D 
scan of the object. This robot has a motion uncertainty of less than 100 pm. However, 
accuracy is only important in case of using a smaller injection probe or a direct injection 
probe, as the probe must touch a pin or a thin trace on the DUT. Figure 2 and Figure 3 
show the measurement setup and the corresponding flowchart, respectively.
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Figure 2. a) Measurement setup. b) Close-up view of the device under test and the 
injection probe. The probe is located on the top of the DUT in this figure. The TLP and 
the interface blocks are not shown here. A drawing is used instead of a photo to preserve
confidentiality.
The injection is done with a magnetic field probe, comprised of a circular loop 
with 8 mm diameter. More details about the probe geometry are given in [5]. When the 
probe is driven with 1 A of current, it can produce a magnetic field strength of 114 A/m 
and induce ~10 mA of current to a 1^0.5 mm loop located ~1 mm beneath the probe 
loop. The rise time of the pulse is about 350 ps.
As shown in Figure 3, when the test starts the robot is moved to the initial 
position, MATLAB then sets the TLP voltage to the minimum value set by the user and
initializes the DUT. The initialization process includes power cycling, zooming to the 
target monitor, and verifying a focused image. A vivid image is critical for correct 
detection of soft-failures. Once the image quality is verified by using the absolute central 
moment algorithm, the test starts. Unlike other commonly used algorithms, absolute 
central moment algorithm does not confuse an out-of-focus image with a low contrast 
image [13]. This capability helps to avoid false failure detection. After every injection, 
the MATLAB code evaluates the image obtained by the webcam for a disturbance. If no 
failure is detected after ten injections, the TLP voltage is increased, and a new image is 
taken for evaluation. If the TLP voltage reaches 3 kV, the robot is moved to the next 
location, the DUT is power cycled, and the TLP voltage is reduced to the minimum 
value. However, if a disturbance is found, the disturbed image and the TLP voltage that 
caused the failure are recorded. Then the DUT is power cycled and initialized again, 
prepared for the next round of tests.
2.2. COMMON SOFT-FAILURE TYPES
The MATLAB code is designed to not only detect the occurrence of failure but 
also to determine the type of failure. The type of soft-failure depends on the DUT 
(firmware and hardware). For the camera under test, the most common failure types are 
black screen, direct restart, hang, and vertical stripes. A black screen error simply turns 
the camera screen black. It may or may not lead to a restart or a hang afterward. A hang 
failure makes the camera freeze; a power cycle is needed to recover the camera from this 
failure. The DUT may also directly restart due to the injections, hence the name direct 
restart failure. A vertical stripes error is the last commonly observed failure for this
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DUT. Given enough time (tens of seconds), this failure will eventually elevate to a 
restart. When a failure is detected by the code, the code power cycles the DUT within a 









Save the disturbed 
image and TLP 
voltage which caused 





Go to the next
position
Figure 3. Flowchart of ESD scanning logic.
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Besides the MATLAB and Arduino codes, the Smartzap software is also needed 
to communicate with the robot and control the robot actions. More information on this 
software is available in [14].
3. SCANNING RESULTS
3.1. SUSCEPTIBILITY MAPS
A susceptibility map shows the sensitive locations of the DUT and the 
corresponding TLP source voltage that caused a failure. The blue color indicates the DUT 
has not failed even at the maximum TLP source voltage (3 kV).
Three sides of the DUT have been scanned: left, top, and back. The front side 
(where the lens is located) and the right side (where the webcam is located) could not be 
scanned (see Figure 2b), because the robot arm should not cover the webcam-to-screen or 
the lens-to-monitor line-of-sight. The bottom side could not be scanned either, because 
the camera is mounted on a stand.
Figure 4 shows the obtained susceptibility maps for the back, the top, and the left 
side of the camera. Analyzing the data shown in Figure 4a reveals that the area near the 
IC and the flex cables are the most sensitive regions. This observation is expected, as the 
flex cables often do not confine the fields well, leading to susceptibility problems. Figure 
4b suggests there are some sensitive regions on the top side of the camera, which lead to 
failure at TLP source voltages as low as 400 V. Opening the camera at this region reveals 
the presence of some circuitry that is directly connected to the IC through flex cables. A 
similar observation holds for Figure 4c.
Each colored rectangular in Figure 4 is about 5*5 mm. With this step size, the 
back side scan takes about 1 hour. A finer resolution is also possible with a smaller probe 
and step size.
3.2. FAILURE-SPECIFIC SUSCEPTIBILITY MAP
During the susceptibility scan, if the device fails, the failure type will also be 
recorded. This information allows us to display a susceptibility map for each failure type, 
as shown in Figure 5. Figure 5a shows three locations on the back side of the camera 
which led the vertical stripes failure when disturbed. Other sensitive locations on the 
back caused a direct restart failure under stress. As observed, a vertical stripes failure is 










Figure 4. Relative susceptibility maps for back side, top side, and left side of the camera. 




Figure 5. Susceptibility maps separated by failure type. a) Vertical strips failure. b) 
Direct restart failure. A drawing is used instead of a photo to preserve confidentiality.
For the top and left side of the camera, only one type of failure was observed: 
black screen failure followed by a system hang. This failure was never observed while 
scanning the back side.
A failure specific susceptibility map can simplify the root cause analysis of soft- 
failure as it can help identify which IC (or which part of the device) is disturbed. For 
instance, if a device fails, one could create a failure specific susceptibility map, narrow 
down or pinpoint the responsible ICs (or parts), and apply relevant ESD countermeasures.
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4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
While hand-held scanning can aid in root cause analysis of ESD-induced soft- 
failure in DUTs with complex geometry, it does not allow for repeatable testing due to 
the difficulty for a human to reproduce (and keep track of) the location under stress. The 
robots used previously for ESD susceptibility scanning could only scan in a 2D plane and 
were limited to flat surfaces or relatively flat PCBs. In this paper, a 6-axis robot was 
employed to scan complex 3D surfaces. A block diagram was presented, depicting 
different parts of the scanner. Three facets of a camera have been scanned, which resulted 
in three susceptibility maps. Furthermore, for each failure type, an individual 
susceptibility map was obtained showing the utility of the 6-axis ESD scanning system.
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2. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
2.1. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The poor repeatability of ESD (electrostatic discharge) immunity tests combined 
with a lack of standardized measurement setup/technique for soft failure investigations 
has led to conflicting observations in the literature regarding the effect of operating 
conditions on ESD susceptibility. In this dissertation, a synchronized injection approach 
was proposed to address this conflict, which was rooted in asynchronous injection. In this 
approach, the system’s current consumption and the DUT’s EMI were monitored to 
synchronize injection and detect soft failures. The repeatability of the tests was improved 
by using a robot scanner. An automated ESD tester was developed by incorporating the 
synchronized injection setups with a robot scanner, which helped us conclude that:
• The operating conditions did affect the ESD susceptibility of an electronic 
device.
• The system load instantaneously increases (decreases) even in a 
manipulated constant load condition.
• The ESD susceptibility of the system is tied to its loading condition and 
instantaneously increases (decreases) with the system load.
Finally, the capabilities of the automated ESD tester were improved by replacing 
the XYZ robot with a 6-axis robot and equipping the tester with soft failure 
characterization algorithms. For the latter, image and audio processing algorithms were
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developed and used to detect a soft failure in the same way a human would do -  through 
sight and hearing. This was the first time that signal-processing algorithms were 
developed and used for soft failure detection and characterization.
Using this upgraded tester, both subtle and severe soft failures were detected and 
characterized -  subtle being a glitch on the display or an audible noise from the speaker; 
and severe being a restart or a system hang. Soft failure-specific susceptibility maps were 
obtained, thanks to this approach; i.e., those locations on the device that lead to this 
specific failure when stressed are found. Such a map facilitates soft failure investigations.
2.2. RECOMMENDATIONS
The detection algorithms developed in this dissertation rely on thresholds to 
detect, determine, and characterize a soft failure. As already mentioned, these thresholds 
need to be set beforehand by the operator, which means a newly occurring soft failure 
cannot be characterized; it can only be detected.
One remedy to this problem is to create a large data set indexing all the possible 
soft failures associated with the device under test (DUT). This is approach is time­
consuming and given that a DUT might get damaged during the data collection process, it 
is impractical. A better approach would be gathering only part of these data and instead 
use machine learning to characterize the newly occurred soft failures.
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